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Antiquated Notions of Womanhood and the Myth of the
Unstoppable Male: Why Post-penetration Rape Should Be a
Crime in North Carolina
On the night of March 23, 2000, in Dorado County, California,
seventeen-year-old Laura T. attended a party with four teenage boys.1
During the course of the evening, she went to a bedroom with two of
the boys, defendants Juan G. and John Z.2  Although Laura
repeatedly told the boys she was "not ready" to have sex, they
removed her clothing and began kissing and fondling her.' John then
left the room while Juan raped her.' As Laura searched in the dark
for her clothing, Juan walked out of the room and John reentered the
room, lay down on the bed, and "nudge[d]" Laura to lie down beside
him.' At first, Laura kissed John voluntarily, but she began to resist
after he rolled on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina.6
Laura told him that she needed to go home, but John would not stop.7
John replied, "Just give me a minute."' Laura responded, "No, I have
to go home."9 John said, "Give me some time," but again Laura said,
"No, I have to go home."1 John did not stop; according to Laura, he
"just stayed inside of me and kept like basically forcing it on me" for
another minute to a minute and a half.11
The juvenile court found that John's actions constituted rape,
and he was committed to a juvenile facility. 12 He appealed, and the
Supreme Court of California accepted the case to consider whether a
1. In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183,184 (Cal. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 184-85. Laura struggled against Juan and told him she did not want to
have sex, but she was not strong enough to stop him. Id. at 185. The court described
Juan's actions as rape. Id. Juan was originally a co-defendant in the case, but after Laura
testified at trial, Juan admitted to charges of sexual battery and unlawful intercourse. Id.
He was not a party to the appeal. See id.
5. Id. at 185.
6. Id. The court assumed for the sake of argument that Laura consented to
penetration but acknowledged that the evidence of consent "was hardly conclusive." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. John testified to the contrary, claiming he ceased intercourse as soon as Laura
said she had to go home. Id.
12. Id. at 184.
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rape occurs when a woman withdraws her initial consent during
sexual intercourse, but the man continues despite her withdrawal of
consent. 3 In his argument that such actions do not constitute rape,
the defendant relied on a North Carolina case, State v. Way. 4 In Way,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that for the purpose of
determining whether a rape has occurred, a woman's consent is
relevant only at the moment of penetration. 5 Under the North
Carolina court's holding, so long as a man accomplishes initial
penetration with a woman's consent, his subsequent actions during
sexual intercourse, no matter the degree of force or coercion, will not
constitute rape. 6 The California court, in In re John Z.,17 expressly
rejected Way and its purported reasoning." In so doing, it shined a
light into a dark corner of North Carolina case law. The California
case demonstrates the error of the reasoning behind Way and reflects
a legal trend 9 rejecting the outdated notions of "womanhood" that
13. Id.
14. See id. at 185 (citing State v. Way, 297 N.C. 293, 254 S.E.2d 760 (1979)). In Way,
the evidence for the State showed that the victim was raped after voluntarily
accompanying the defendant to an upstairs bedroom where he beat and threatened to kill
her. State v. Way, 297 N.C. 293, 294-95, 254 S.E.2d 760, 760-61 (1979). For a more
thorough discussion of the facts of Way, see infra note 28.
15. See Way, 297 N.C. at 297, 254 S.E.2d at 762. The defendant in In re John Z. also
cited a Maryland case with a similar holding. See In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 185 (citing
Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1268-70 (Md. 1980)). In that case, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland stated:
Given the fact that consent must precede penetration, it follows in our view that
although a woman may have consented to a sexual encounter, even to
intercourse, if that consent is withdrawn prior to the act of penetration, then it
cannot be said that she has consented to sexual intercourse. On the other hand,
ordinarily if she consents prior to penetration and withdraws the consent
following penetration, there is no rape.
Battle, 414 A.2d at 1270. Of the courts to consider the issue, only those in North Carolina,
California, and Maryland have held that a woman's consent is relevant only prior to and at
the moment of penetration. See People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985),
overruled by 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003); Battle, 414 A.2d at 1270; Way, 297 N.C. at 297, 254
S.E.2d at 762.
16. See Way, 297 N.C. at 297,254 S.E.2d at 762.
17. In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003).
18. See id. at 186 (calling the reasoning of the North Carolina court "unsound").
19. In re John Z. is the most publicized case in a series of cases defining post-
penetration rape as a crime. See McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 84 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that Alaska statutory law does not "limit sexual penetration to the moment of
initial penetration"); State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 961-63 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994)
(rejecting the defendant's argument that if there is consent at penetration, the subsequent
withdrawal of consent can not convert sexual intercourse into rape); State v. Bunyard, 75
P.3d 750, 756 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that "sexual intercourse performed when one
person is under force or fear is rape" and that "[i]t does not matter if the force or fear
exists at the initiation of the act or whether it comes after consent is withdrawn"); State v.
Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1070-71 (Me. 1985) (noting that "common sense" supported its
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have defined the issues of spousal rape, date rape, and, now, "post-
penetration rape. ''2' This Recent Development analyzes North
Carolina law on the issue of post-penetration rape in light of In re
John Z. and this legal trend. It determines that the rule established
by Way is inconsistent with both current state statutes and expanding
legal notions of female sexual bodily autonomy. It concludes that
North Carolina statutory law should be amended to make post-
penetration rape a criminal offense.
At the core of the crime of rape is the question of the victim's
consent.2' In North Carolina, rape is defined by statute and is divided
into the separate crimes of first-degree forcible rape and second-
holding that the Maine rape statute prohibited post-penetration rape); State v. Crims, 540
N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the crime of rape includes "forcible
continuance of initially consensual intercourse"); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D.
1994) (refusing to adopt a rule under which initial consent alone determines whether
forcible, continued intercourse is rape). But see Battle, 414 A.2d at 1268-70 (holding that
if a woman withdraws consent following penetration, a man's failure to cease intercourse
is not rape). In 2003, Illinois became the first state to enact a statute in recognition of this
legal trend. See Act effective July 25, 2003, ch. 38, 2003 Ill. Laws 389 (codified as amended
at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (2003)) (providing that a person who initially consents to
sexual penetration is deemed not to have consented to any sexual penetration or conduct
occurring after the person withdraws consent); Christopher Wills, Illinois' New Rape Law
Clarifies That Consent Can Be Withdrawn During Sex, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), July 29, 2003 (stating that the National Crime Victim Law Institute believes "the
law is the first of its kind in the country"), available at http://newsobserver.
com/24hour/nation/story/955657p-6689573c.html; see also infra notes 116-18 and
accompanying text (discussing the Illinois law and proposing a statute for North Carolina
modeled after the Illinois law).
20. The term "post-penetration rape" was first used by a law student in 1991. See
Amy McLellan, Comment, Post-penetration Rape-Increasing the Penalty, 31 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 779, 780 n.6 (1991). For a discussion of antiquated notions of womanhood
in spousal rape and date rape, see infra notes 36-42, 45 and accompanying text.
21. "Female nonconsent has long been viewed as the key element in the definition of
rape." SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29 (1987). Historically, in order to demonstrate
nonconsent, a woman was required to resist "to the utmost." CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE
HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 23
(1992). As one court phrased the requirement, "[T]here must be the most vehement
exercise of every physical means or faculty within the woman's power to resist the
penetration of her person, and this must be shown to persist until the offense is
consummated." See Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538-39 (Wis. 1906) (holding that a
sixteen-year-old virgin, who screamed and struggled as her assailant attempted to strangle
her, failed to make the "terrific registance which the determined woman should make,"
and thus did not demonstrate her nonconsent). During the feminist movement of the
1970s, states began to discard the legal requirement of utmost resistance. See SPOHN &
HORNEY, supra, at 23-24; Jeffrey Toobin, The Consent Defense: Rape Laws May Have
Changed, but Questions About the Accuser Are Often the Same, NEW YORKER, Sept. 1,
2003, at 42. Now, almost all states have repealed the requirement of resistance to the
utmost, although most states require at least some evidence of "reasonable" resistance by
a rape victim. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 31 (1998).
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degree forcible rape. Lack of consent is an element of both
offenses.23 Lack of consent may be established through evidence of
the victim's oral protestations; physical resistance by the victim is not
required to prove lack of consent.24 In addition, in North Carolina as
elsewhere, a person may freely withdraw consent to sexual
intercourse before penetration.25 Where there are multiple acts of
sexual intercourse, consent for a prior act, whether with the
defendant or a third party, does not constitute consent for a
subsequent act of intercourse.26 Where, however, there is only one
act of sexual intercourse, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
stated that consent may be withdrawn only prior to penetration.27 As
the court held in State v. Way: "If the actual penetration is
accomplished with the woman's consent, the accused is not guilty of
rape .... 28 Under its holding, as long as a man accomplishes initial
22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2 to -27.3 (2001) (defining first-degree and second-
degree rape).
23. See §§ 14-27.2 to -27.3 (defining rape as intercourse "against the will of the other
person"); see also State v. Booher, 305 N.C. 554, 561, 290 S.E.2d 561, 564 (1982) ("The
words 'against her will' as used in the law of rape, connote the victim's lack of consent.").
Both first-degree rape and second-degree rape involve vaginal intercourse by force and
against a person's will. See id. A conviction for first-degree rape requires proof of (1) the
use of a deadly weapon, (2) aiding or abetting, or (3) serious personal injury to the victim
or another person. See id.; State v. Barnette, 304 N.C. 447, 458, 284 S.E.2d 298, 305 (1981).
By statute, the crime of rape is defined by vaginal intercourse; as such, it is limited to
sexual activity that occurs between a man and a woman, specifically, the penetration of the
female sexual organ by the male sexual organ. State v. Jones, 249 N.C. 134, 136-37, 105
S.E.2d 513, 514 (1958); State v. Summers, 92 N.C. App. 453, 456, 374 S.E.2d 631, 633
(1988). Crimes not involving vaginal intercourse receive separate treatment as forcible
"sexual offenses." See §§ 14-27.4 to -27.5. Thus, because rape in North Carolina is limited
by definition to vaginal intercourse, this Recent Development discusses rape as a crime
involving a man and a woman.
24. See State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 408, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475 (1984); State v. Hall,
293 N.C. 559, 563, 238 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1977). North Carolina is in a progressive minority
on this issue; most courts in the United States require at least some evidence of physical
resistance. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 31. But see infra notes 81-87 and
accompanying text (arguing that North Carolina law does in fact impose a physical
resistance requirement on women who withdraw consent for sexual intercourse after
penetration).
25. See State v. Way, 297 N.C. 293, 296-97, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761-62 (1979).
26. See id. (" 'If the particular act of intercourse was without her consent, the offense
is rape without regard to the consent given for prior acts to third persons or the
defendant' ") (quoting R. ANDERSON, 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 302 (1957)); see also State v. Long, 93 N.C. 542, 544-45 (1885) ("[T]he fact that a woman
is a common strumpet or the mistress of the defendant, is no bar .... Nor can it make any
difference that she consented, upon certain terms, if the defendant ... attempted by force
to have carnal knowledge of her person without her consent." (citation omitted)).
27. See Way, 297 N.C. at 296, 254 S.E.2d at 761-62.
28. Id. at 297, 254 S.E.2d at 762. In Way, the evidence for the State showed that
Beverly Hester voluntarily accompanied the defendant to an upstairs room. Id. at 294, 254
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penetration with a woman's consent, his subsequent use of force or
coercion during the same act of intercourse will not constitute rape.29
This holding was flawed in several respects. First, the Way court
failed to include a statement of direct authority or other explanation
for its interpretation of the law.3" The court cited only one case in
support of its holding: the 1885 case of State v. Long.31 In Long, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina stated that "[a]lthough [a
woman] ... was taken first with her own consent, if she was
afterwards forced against her will, the offense [of rape] would be
committed. 3 2 In other words, when a woman consents to one act of
intercourse, her consent does not automatically extend to future acts
of intercourse; there must be consent for each act.33 However, the
court failed to explain how this holding supports the holding of Way
that a woman cannot withdraw consent during a single act of
S.E.2d at 760. Once upstairs, the defendant told her that "she had ten minutes to take off
her clothes or he would beat her." Id. When she tried to leave the room, the defendant
struck her in the face, and stood over her with his hand raised as she began to cry. Id. The
defendant told Beverly that by the time anyone came upstairs to help her, her "head
would be through the wall." Id. He forced her to have anal intercourse, and next
threatened to kill her if she did not perform oral sex on him. Id. at 295, 254 S.E.2d at 760.
He then forced her to have vaginal intercourse after she begged him not to because she
was a virgin. Id. at 295, 254 S.E.2d at 760-61. The defendant's evidence, on the other
hand, tended to show that Beverly took off her own clothes and voluntarily engaged in
intercourse with him. Id. When she told him she was a virgin, the defendant said he
thought she was "just kidding." Id.
29. See id. at 296-97, 254 S.E.2d at 761-62.
30. See id.; see also McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 83 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (noting that
the Way court cited no authority); State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 963 (Conn. App. Ct.
1994) (stating that Way is "not persuasive because it contains no analysis or explanation
but is merely a bald statement that the trial court was wrong"); State v. Robinson, 496
A.2d 1067, 1070 (Me. 1985) (finding that the Way court cited no authority on point to
come to its "mere ipse dixit conclusion").
31. See Way, 297 N.C. at 296, 254 S.E.2d at 761 (citing State v. Long, 93 N.C. 542
(1885)).
32. State v. Long, 93 N.C. 542 (1885) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wright v. State, 23
Tenn. (4 Hum.) 193, 198 (1843)).
33. See id. at 544-45. In addition to citing an inapplicable case from 1885, the Way
court ignored an even older criminal law doctrine: the doctrine of concurrence of the
elements. See HASCAL R. BRILL, CYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINAL LAW § 88 (1922) (citing
early cases requiring concurrence of the elements); JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 197-99 (2d. ed. 1995) (citing at least one case from the
nineteenth century requiring concurrence of the elements). Generally, for a crime to
occur, there must be an actus reus and a mens rea. Id. at 177. The State must prove that a
defendant caused the proscribed social harm, the actus reus, with the necessary mental
state, the mens rea. Id. Under the doctrine of concurrence of the elements, a crime does
not occur unless there is temporal concurrence between the actus reus and the mens rea.
Id. As this Recent Development argues, in the crime of post-penetration rape,
concurrence of the elements clearly exists. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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intercourse.34  Subsequent North Carolina cases also offer no
explanation.
The court's faulty statement of authority belies a more likely
explanation for its holding: archaic views of women. Way was
decided in 1979, the same year that the North Carolina legislature
enacted an express marital rape exemption, also known as the spousal
rape defense.35 The exemption bestowed upon husbands an absolute
privilege to rape their wives, with or without the use of force.3 6 The
underlying rationale for the exemption was the notion of a wife's
irrevocable consent.37  At the moment of marriage, a woman
irrevocably consented to sexual intercourse with her husband; once
that consent was given, it could not be withdrawn. 38 During the 1980s,
feminists and legal reformers attacked the marital rape exemption,
arguing that such laws were archaic and inconsistent with modern
views of women.39  In 1993, after significant debate, the North
Carolina legislature followed the example of other states and
repealed the marital rape exemption.4"
Although the North Carolina legislature repealed the marital
rape exemption, Way remains a legal relic in North Carolina case law,
34. See Way, 297 N.C. at 296-97, 254 S.E.2d at 761-62 (stating merely, "This is not the
law").
35. Compare Way, 297 N.C. 293, 254 S.E.2d 760 (decided in May, 1979), with Act of
May 29, 1979, ch. 682, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 725, 726-27 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2001) (enacted in May, 1979)).
36. See ESTRICH, supra note 21, at 72.
37. See id.
38. See id. "Between husband and wife, the law's conception of consent remained the
one that British Chief Justice Lord Hale had set forth in the seventeenth century: '[B]y
their matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given herself in this kind unto her
husband, which she cannot retract.' " SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 18 (quoting 1
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (S. Emlyn ed.,
1778)). The marital rape exemption may find its roots in an era that pre-dates even the
eighteenth century. The apostle Paul believed that spouses each had rights to the other's
body: "The wife has no rights over her own body; it is the husband who has them. In the
same way, the husband has no rights over his body; the wife has them." 1 Corinthians 7:2-
6. The Christian reasoning behind the marital rape exemption was expressed in early
American law under the view that a wife was a husband's property: "[T]he two were one,
and that one was him." MARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING
WOMEN SERIOUSLY 316-17 (2001).
39. Jaye Sitton, Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Marital Rape Allowance, 72
N.C. L. REV. 261,269-76 (1993).
40. See Act of July 5, 1993, ch. 274, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 540 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-27.8 (2001)); Sitton, supra note 39, at 269-86. But see CAROLINA A. FORELL
& DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A
MEASURE OF MAN 232-33 (2000) (noting that the burden of proof and historical
presumptions make it difficult to prosecute marital rape cases and arguing that marital
rape remains "essentially a legal nullity").
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a holdover from the same antiquated ways of thinking that supported
the marital rape exemption. Way's status as relic becomes
particularly clear when one considers the parallels between the
former marital rape exemption and the current law on post-
penetration rape. Both are based on a "crucial point" of consent.
For the marital rape exemption, the crucial point was the moment of
marriage.41 After the point of marriage, a woman's consent for sexual
intercourse with her husband became irrevocable. 2 Similarly, the
crucial point of post-penetration rape is the moment of penetration.43
At penetration, a woman's consent for sexual intercourse with a man
becomes irrevocable.' In both former marital rape law and current
post-penetration rape law, after the crucial point of consent, the
degree of force or coercion applied by the man is irrelevant.45  The
initial agreement for sex-formerly in the form of marriage, now in
the form of penetration-becomes an irrevocable license for a man to
continue sexual intercourse and avoid the penalties associated with
rape.
These antiquated views of female sexuality embodied in North
Carolina precedent were echoed by the California Court of Appeals
in its interpretation of Way. In People v. Vela,46 the court determined
41. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
43. See People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that "the
moment of initial penetration appears to be the crucial point in the crime of rape").
44. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. As critics of the decision in In re
John Z. stated, "[O]nce you've said 'yes,' you lose the right to say 'no.' " Cathy Young,
Troubling Questions About Rape and Consent, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20,2003, at A15.
45. See supra notes 27-29, 37-38 and accompanying text. Interestingly, similar
arguments regarding the sexual "point of no return" were made regarding date rape. Lois
Pineau argues that women who dress and act in sexually provocative ways are often
thought to give a type of irrevocable consent that forms the basis of a "contract" for sex:
Attempts to explain that women have a right to behave in sexually provocative
ways without suffering dire consequences still meet with surprisingly tough
resistance. Even people who find nothing wrong or sinful with sex itself, in any
of its forms, tend to suppose that women must not behave sexually unless they
are prepared to carry through on some fuller course of sexual interaction. The
logic of this response seems to be that at some point a woman's behavior
commits her to following through on the full course of a sexual encounter as it is
defined by her assailant. At some point she has made an agreement, or formed a
contract, and once that is done, her contractor is entitled to demand that she
satisfy the terms of that contract.
Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, in SEX, MORALITY AND THE LAW 434-35
(Lori Gruen & George E. Panichas eds., 1997).
46. 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), overruled by 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003). In
Vela, the defendant, a nineteen-year-old man, was charged with raping a fourteen-year-old
girl. Id. at 162. The defendant reported to a deputy that the girl originally consented but
changed her mind during intercourse. Id.
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that Way stood for the proposition that "the crucial point in the crime
of rape" is the moment of penetration.47  In support of this
proposition and in concurrence with North Carolina court's holding,
the Vela court stated:
[T]he essence of the crime of rape is the outrage to the person
and feelings of the female resulting from the nonconsensual
violation of her womanhood. When a female willingly consents
to an act of sexual intercourse, the penetration by the male
cannot constitute a violation of her womanhood nor cause
outrage to her person and feelings. If she withdraws consent
during the act of sexual intercourse and the male forcibly
continues the act without interruption, the female may certainly
feel outrage because of the force applied or because the male
ignores her wishes, but the sense of outrage to her person and
feelings could hardly be of the same magnitude as that resulting
from an initial nonconsensual violation of her womanhood.48
The California court concluded that in a situation in which a woman
withdraws consent after penetration, the "essential guilt of rape" is
absent.49
As in Way, the error of this reasoning is its dependence on a
value assignment grounded in archaic views of women. In Vela, the
California court applied the Way decision as a lens through which it
focused on the "magnitude" of a woman's "outrage" after her
withdrawal of consent." With the North Carolina holding as a guide,
the Vela court assumed that a woman would feel less outrage, and
thus suffer less of an injury, if she initially consented to sex.5
According to the court, there can be no "violation of her
womanhood" if a woman initially consents to penetration.52 In other
47. Id. at 164.
48. Id. at 165. In support of its finding that the crime of rape is grounded in
"outrage," the court observed that sexual intercourse with a corpse is not rape because "at
the moment of sexual penetration there is no outrage to the feelings of the dead victim."
Id. at 164-65. The court cited section 263 of the California Penal Code, which provided
that outrage is the essential guilt of rape. Id. (citing the California Penal Code). North
Carolina has no such provision in its rape statutes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.1 to -
27.10 (2001).
49. See id.
50. See Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164; see also In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 186 (Cal. 2003)
(calling the reasoning of the Way court, the Battle court, and the Vela court "unsound");
McLellan, supra note 20, at 804-08 (accepting the possibility of this conception of the
"essential guilt of rape," but arguing it is inconsistent with the California Penal Code).
51. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65.
52. See id. at 165. The court did not define the term "womanhood"; its opinion
reveals only that "womanhood" is something "violated" by initial, unconsented
penetration, and that such a violation is more harmful to a woman than any actions that
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words, unconsented penetration is a greater harm than subsequent
unconsented sexual intercourse. 3 A value assignment provides the
basis for this finding: a greater value is given to a woman's
unpenetrated condition. The court's message is that once a woman
has been penetrated, she has less to lose; as a result, she will feel less
"outrage" over actions that occur after penetration.54
This assignment of greater value to women's "unpenetrated"
condition is the same value assignment that patriarchal societies have
made about women for centuries. In ancient civilizations, women's
sexuality was a commodity, valued according to virginity or chastity,
and the value of a woman's virginity or chastity accrued to the benefit
of her father, husband, owner, or family.55 Additionally, the loss of a
might follow initial penetration. See id.
53. See id.
54. Professor Catharine MacKinnon might attribute the Vela court's assignment of
less value to the harms women experience after penetration to the "male supremacy's
paradigm of sex" in rape law. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Rape: On Coercion and
Consent, in SEX, MORALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 45, at 420. According to Professor
MacKinnon:
[Tihe crime of rape centers on penetration. The law to protect women's
sexuality from forcible violation and expropriation defines that protection in
male genital terms. Women do resent forced penetration. But penile invasion of
the vagina may be less pivotal to women's sexuality ... than it is upon male
sexuality. This definitive element of rape centers on male-defined loss. It also
centers upon one way men define loss of exclusive access. In this light, rape, as
legally defined, appears more a crime against female monogamy (exclusive
access by one man) than against women's sexual dignity or intimate
integrity.... The moment women "have" it-"have sex" in the dual
gender/sexuality sense, it is lost as theirs. To have it is to have it taken away.
This may explain the male incomprehension that, once a woman has had sex, she
loses anything when subsequently raped. To them women have nothing to lose.
Id. Applying Professor MacKinnon's theory to post-penetration rape cases, the Vela court
employed "male-defined" terms of loss that center on penetration to measure the injury to
the victim in that case. See Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (noting that once she has been
penetrated, a woman's "sense of outrage to her person and feelings could hardly be of the
same magnitude as that resulting from an initial nonconsensual violation of her
womanhood"). The court expressed clearly the "male incomprehension" that after a
woman is penetrated, she has as much to lose from the subsequent denial of bodily
autonomy caused by a man continuing to force sex upon her as she had prior to
penetration. See id.
55. See, e.g., 1 A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE WEST 306 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Pauline Schmitt Pantel ed., 1992) (noting that in ancient societies, virgin female slaves
were sold for higher prices than non-virgin female slaves); BERNARD BRAXTON, WOMEN,
SEX AND RACE: A REALISTIC VIEW OF SEXISM AND RACISM 152 (1973) (stating that in
both ancient civilizations and in the Victorian Age, women were more valuable in the
"marriage market" if they were virgins). One historian describes "female purity" as "a
family asset, jealously guarded by the men in the family." GERDA LERNER, THE
CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 94 (1986). Lower-class families benefited from the virgin
status of daughters and sisters, whose enforced chastity made them eligible to become the
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woman's chastity was considered an injury to men. 6 In ancient
societies-and in the more recent American common law tradition-
women were considered the legal property of their husbands and
fathers. 7 When women were raped, the injury of that rape was a
devaluation of men's property."' This archaic view of women as
property, valued according to their sexual relations with men, has
largely faded away.59 The Vela court's holding in 1985, however,
assigning greater value to a woman's unpenetrated condition, is a
modern-day echo of this archaic view of women as property and is out
wives and concubines of upper-class men. See id. Upper-class families arranged the
marriages of their daughters "to consolidate their own social and economic power"
through "military and business alliances." See id. at 111. Families also benefited from the
bride-prices received from the marriages of daughters. See id. at 106. In ancient
Mesopotamia, for example, "[tihe main value to a family in having daughters was their
potential as brides. The bride-price received for a daughter was usually used to finance
the acquisition of a bride for a son." Id. Thus, the "family asset" of female virginity could
be inextricably linked to the success of the family as a whole. See id.
56. See, e.g., LERNER, supra note 55, at 116 (stating that the ancient rape laws "all
incorporated the principle that the injured party is the husband or father of the raped
woman").
57. See id.; see also Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU et al. at 6, 11, Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444), available at 1976 WL 181482 (noting that the origin of
the death penalty for the crime of rape in the United States came from the conception of
rape as a crime against the husband or father of a victim).
58. In ancient societies, the devaluation of men's property rights in female virginity
was punished:
A virgin was considered a valuable asset .... Any infringement upon [the
ownership of women's sexual and reproductive function] through premarital
relations rendered the asset less valuable, and might even turn it into a liability.
Therefore, [a] rapist was required to pay for and remove the liability because the
rapist destroyed its value.
Ricki Lewis Tannen, Setting the Agenda for the 1990s: The Historical Foundations of
Gender Bias in the Law: A Context for Reconstruction, 42 FLA. L. REV. 163, 172 (1990).
Under the laws of the Hebrew Bible, the devaluation of men's property rights in female
virginity required reimbursement: a man who raped a virgin was required to provide her
father with a payment, and the rape victim was required to marry her rapist. "If a man
find a damsel that is a virgin ... and lie with her, and they be found; [t]hen the man that
lay with her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be his
wife." Deuteronomy 22:28-29. Similarly, if a man married a woman, and then wrongfully
claimed she was not a virgin, he was required to pay the woman's father one hundred
shekels of silver "because he hath brought up an evil name upon a virgin of Israel." See id.
at 22:13-19. On the other hand, if the man rightfully claimed that his bride was not a
virgin, "[t]hen ... the men of her city shall stone her with stones that she die: because she
hath wrought folly in Israel, to play the whore in her father's house." Id. at 22:20-21.
59. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) ("Nowhere in the
common-law world-indeed in any modern society-is a woman regarded as chattel or
demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition
as a whole human being. Chip by chip, over the years those archaic notions have been cast
aside .... ).
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of place in modern legal jurisprudence.6 ° Unfortunately, in North
Carolina, this value assignment survives in the holding of State v.
Way.
Assigning greater harm to the moment of penetration, while
minimizing subsequent harms women suffer when raped, also ignores
the reality of the experience of rape for many women. Admittedly,
initial unconsented penetration is a terrible injury; it is in this moment
of intrusion that a person's right to control their bodily integrity is
first violated. This Recent Development does not seek to minimize
that harm. Instead, it contends that the Vela and Way courts ignored
the harm of loss of sexual autonomy that continues beyond the
moment of initial penetration whenever sex is imposed against a
person's will. As feminist scholars, medical practitioners, and victims
have observed, the harm of rape is about more than penetration-it is
about the loss of autonomy, dignity, and control that arises from
being a target of intimate violence, power, and rage.61 The Vela court
disregarded, or at least considered minimal, the outrage a woman
might feel at the loss of sexual bodily autonomy that occurs from the
violence of rape beyond the moment of initial penetration.62 Its value
assumptions also ignore the fact that courts generally have no way to
measure the true outrage a victim feels when denied sexual bodily
autonomy.63 The Supreme Court of California noted the error of
60. See McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 84 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting a defendant's
reliance on Vela and stating that "a view that our sexual assault statute is based on
considerations of 'outrage' to a victim's 'womanhood'.. . represents archaic and outmoded
social conventions"); State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 963 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (declaring
the Vela court's reasoning "archaic and unrealistic").
61. Feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon argues:
[Rape is an] attack on the self, which can be shattered; the degradation of human
dignity; the violation of trust and destruction of spirit .... Rape can destroy
one's sense of safety, belief in integrity and worth, belief in and enjoyment of
intimate relationships, and faith in one's place of respect in family or
community.... Dread and terror of rape and anticipation of its possibility can
set limits on women's freedom and access to a full life.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY: RAPE LAW 778 (2001). As stated by
Stephen Schulhofer: "[U]nwanted sex [can be] degrading, physically painful, damaging to
self-esteem, and productive of lasting psychological damage." SCHULHOFER, supra note
21, at 279. Psychiatrists have theorized that the "profound and devastating loss"
experienced by rape survivors arises in part from the threat of annihilation present in all
rapes. Deborah S. Rose, "Worse Than Death": Psychodynamics of Rape Victims and the
Need for Psychotherapy, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 817, 818 (1986). For a poignant and
powerful account of rape and its psychological aftermath, see generally NANCY VENABLE
RAINE, AFTER SILENCE: RAPE AND MY JOURNEY BACK (1998).
62. See People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), overruled by 60
P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003).
63. See In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 186 (2003). Unlike the California Court of
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these assumptions in In re John Z., and correctly rejected the holdings
of the Vela and Way courts.64
Moreover, if-as indicated by Vela-the holding of Way is
grounded in notions of "outrage" felt by victims when their
"womanhood" is violated,65 the holding is grounded in error.
Although outrage and suffering by victims are significant and valid
reasons for punishing rapists, they are not essential elements of the
crime of rape in North Carolina.66 The North Carolina statutes do not
make outrage a mandatory condition, or even an aggravating factor,
in determining the crime of rape.67
Indeed, an accurate reading of the North Carolina statutes
indicates that a man who refuses to cease intercourse immediately
after a woman withdraws consent has committed second-degree rape.
Under the North Carolina second-degree rape statute: "A person is
guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal
intercourse with another person by force and against the will of the
other person."'" The elements to be established in a second-degree
rape case are: (1) vaginal intercourse, (2) with a person, (3) by force
and against the person's will.69  These elements are met when a
woman withdraws consent after penetration but a man continues
imposing sex on her, either by physical force or against her wishes,
regardless of initial consent for penetration.0 As to the first element,
vaginal intercourse, North Carolina case law defines it to mean
"sexual intercourse," specifically, the penetration of the female sexual
organ by the male sexual organ. 71 There is nothing in this definition
of vaginal intercourse to suggest that the vaginal intercourse
Appeals, the Supreme Court of California assumed a victim's outrage would be
"substantial." Id.
64. Id.
65. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
66. Similarly, the court in In re John Z. concluded that victim outrage was not an
element of the offense of rape in California. In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 186.
67. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2 to -27.3 (2001). North Carolina does not include
virginity as an element of any rape offense. See INST. OF GOV'T, UNIV. OF N. CAROLINA
AT CHAPEL HILL, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMES: A GUIDEBOOK ON THE ELEMENTS OF
CRIME 144 (Robert L. Farb ed., 5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter INST. OF GOV'T. Arguably,
such an element would improperly focus on the victim's "outrage" over the rape rather
than the defendant's actions.
68. § 14-27.3.
69. See INST. OF GOV'T, supra note 67, at 146.
70. See id. In addition, if a perpetrator used a weapon, inflicted serious bodily injury
on a victim, or was assisted by other individuals to force a woman to continue having sex
with him after she withdrew consent, he would arguably be guilty of first-degree rape. See
supra note 23 (setting out the elements of first-degree rape in North Carolina).
71. See State v. Jones, 249 N.C. 134, 136-37, 105 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1958).
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occurring after withdrawal of consent is not vaginal intercourse within
the meaning of the statute. As noted by other state courts, "In
anybody's everyday lexicon, continued penetration of the female sex
organ by the male sex organ ... is factually 'sexual intercourse.' ,2
These courts came to this conclusion on the basis of both elementary
principles of statutory construction and basic common sense.73 In
addition, in North Carolina, the slightest penetration is sufficient to
violate the rape statute.7a North Carolina cases have not held that
"intercourse is complete" upon penetration, or that only initial
penetration constitutes intercourse. Such a holding would mean that
the act that begins intercourse, namely penetration, is also the act that
completes intercourse. Such an interpretation would defy common
sense.
75
The second and third elements of the North Carolina second-
72. See State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 963 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (quoting State v.
Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Me. 1985)); see also McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 84
(Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Alaska statutory law does not "limit sexual
penetration to the moment of initial penetration"); State v. Bunyard, 75 P.3d 750, 756
(Kan. Ct. App. 2003) ("Nowhere [in the Kansas rape statute] does it state that the act of
sexual intercourse ends with penetration. Instead, the [statutory definition of sexual
intercourse] merely establishes a minimum amount of contact necessary to prove the
offense.").
73. See, e.g., Siering, 644 A.2d at 963 (citing "our own best judgment of the meaning of
our statute interpreted in the light of the common sense of the situation before us" in
support of its holding); State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Me. 1985) (citing the
legislative intent behind the statute and "common sense" in support of its holding).
74. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.10 (providing that "[p]enetration, however slight, is
vaginal intercourse"); State v. Murry, 277 N.C. 197, 203, 176 S.E.2d 738, 742 (1970) ("It is
not necessary that the vagina be entered or that the hymen be ruptured; the entering of
the vulva or labia is sufficient."); State v. Summers, 92 N.C. App. 453, 456, 374 S.E.2d 631,
633 (1988) (stating that vaginal intercourse includes even the slightest penetration).
75. See Siering, 644 A.2d at 962-63. The Connecticut Court of Appeals, in construing
the state's rape statute, made this point:
We construe the statutory reference to penetration as establishing the minimum
amount of evidence necessary to prove that intercourse has taken place. The
statute does not read that "intercourse is complete" upon penetration; rather, it
provides that "penetration, however slight [is sufficient] to
complete ... intercourse." We do not construe this to mean that only the initial
penetration constitutes intercourse. The defendant's argument would mean that
the act that commences intercourse is also the act that simultaneously concludes
intercourse.
Id. at 962 (citation omitted). The court went on to conclude that such an interpretation of
its statute would be "bizarre" and "absurd." See id. Connecticut makes reference to the
"slightest penetration" criterion in its statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-65(2) (2003)
("Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse."). The logic of
the argument applies to North Carolina as well, where both statutory and case law have
defined intercourse to include any penetration, however slight. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
27.10; Murry, 277 N.C. at 203,176 S.E.2d at 742; Summers, 92 N.C. App. at 456, 374 S.E.2d
at 631.
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degree rape statute are also satisfied by post-penetration rape. The
second element, requiring vaginal intercourse to be "with a person, 76
obviously would be met where the victim of the post-penetration rape
is a woman. Finally, the third element, requiring the intercourse to be
"by force and against the person's will,"' 77 would be met where a
woman withdraws her consent during sexual intercourse, but a man
employs actual or constructive force to continue sexual intercourse.78
Additionally, in a post-penetration rape, all three of these elements
exist concurrently, satisfying the doctrine of concurrence of the
elements. 79  Thus, as a matter of statutory construction, post-
penetration rape should constitute the crime of second-degree rape in
North Carolina. Indeed, other state courts have interpreted their
rape statutes in this fashion to determine that post-penetration rape
falls within the meaning of their rape statutes.80  These courts,
however, did not have binding case law to hinder this interpretation
of their rape statutes. North Carolina, on the other hand, has the rule
established by the state supreme court in State v. Way, which might
prevent a court from interpreting the state rape statutes to prohibit
post-penetration rape.
Moreover, the rule established by Way impliedly imposes a
physical resistance requirement on rape victims. Under the Way
court's holding, where a woman withdraws consent following
penetration, whether a rape has occurred depends on how successful
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3 (2001).
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 293 N.C. 1, 13, 235 S.E.2d 203, 211 (1977) ("The force
necessary to meet the ... requirement, as explained on numerous occasions by this Court,
need not be physical force but may take the form of fear, fright, or coercion.").
79. Under the doctrine of concurrence of the elements, for a crime to have occurred,
there must be concurrence of the actus reus and mens rea. DRESSLER, supra note 33, at
177. The actus reus is the proscribed social harm. Id. The mens rea is the requisite
mental state required by the criminal statute. Id. The principle of concurrence of the
elements requires that the defendant possess the requisite mens rea at the same time that
his conduct causes the proscribed social harm. Id. The temporal concurrence of the mens
rea and actus reus must be more than coincidental; the defendant must be motivated by
the thought processes that constituted his mens rea to create the social harm. Id.
A case of post-penetration rape satisfies the doctrine of concurrence of the
elements. Admittedly, at the moment of penetration, a defendant in such a case would not
have the requisite mens rea for a crime to occur, since at that moment the woman
consented to sexual intercourse. However, after the woman withdraws consent for sexual
intercourse, and the defendant persists in imposing intercourse on her, concurrence of the
elements is satisfied. At that moment, the defendant knowingly, with the requisite mens
rea, forces vaginal intercourse on his victim against her will, the actus reus. Special thanks
to Eric L. Muller, George R. Ward Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill School of Law, who suggested this concurrence of the elements analysis.
80. See Siering, 644 A.2d at 963; State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Me. 1985).
1271
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
she is in her physical struggle against her attacker.81 For example, a
woman who is strong enough to resist her attacker so that she is able
to dislodge the male organ, however briefly, will have a viable rape
claim if he penetrates her again. In such a scenario, through
physical resistance, she has effectively manifested her withdrawal of
consent prior to the moment of the subsequent penetration. 3 On the
other hand, a woman who unsuccessfully attempts to extricate herself
from her attacker will have no rape claim so long as her attacker
maintains penetration.' The Way court's holding thus accomplishes
two things: first, it protects North Carolina defendants from rape
prosecution based solely on their strength and use of force. 5 Second,
it imposes a strength requirement on women who withdraw consent
during sexual intercourse; women must physically struggle against
their attackers and they must be strong enough to extricate
themselves at least briefly in order for a rape to have occurred. This
requirement for physical resistance is inconsistent with North
Carolina law86 and modern rape law generally.87
Nonetheless, there are those who would defend the rule of law
established in Way. Perhaps not surprisingly, its defenders, in
attacking In re John Z., have made the same arguments that were
made in opposition to the repeal of the spousal rape defense.
Opponents of the decision in In re John Z., like opponents of the
repeal of the rape exemption for husbands, charge that the law
81. See State v. Way, 297 N.C. 293, 297,254 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1979).
82. See Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070-71.
83. See id. In addition, it is possible that woman might be able to trick a man into
removing his penis. This method, however, would not adequately communicate her
withdrawal of consent in the same way that physical resistance or a clear statement would.
Thus, she would not have a valid rape claim if he penetrates her again.
84. See id. The Robinson court identified this inconsistency not as a physical
resistance requirement, but rather as a practical unfairness, stating that "it hardly makes
sense to protect from rape prosecution the party whose compulsion through physical force
or threat of serious bodily harm is so overwhelming that there is no possible withdrawal,
however brief." Id.
85. See Siering, 644 A.2d at 963 (rejecting a construction of the Connecticut rape
statute to allow post-penetration rape, finding that it would be "absurd" to "protect[] from
prosecution a defendant whose physical force is so great or so overwhelming that there is
no possibility of the victim's causing even momentary displacement of the male organ").
86. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 408, 312 S.E.2d 470, 476 (1984) (holding
that physical resistance by a victim is not required to prove lack of consent); State v. Hall,
293 N.C. 559, 563,238 S.E.2d 473,476 (1977) (same).
87. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 30-31 (noting that most states have
repealed resistance requirements); David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 317, 357 (2000) (noting that modern statutory reforms largely have eroded the
requirement of physical resistance).
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victimizes men.88 For example, in North Carolina, the repeal of the
spousal rape defense was opposed by a " 'coterie of lawmakers who
raised the specter of vengeful wives victimizing their husbands.' ",89
Similarly, critics of In re John Z. fear that the decision invites
victimization of men, and that spiteful women will use the law as an
opportunity to falsely cry rape90 or to absolve themselves of
responsibility when they later feel guilty about their choice to have
sex.9' These arguments, however, overlook the harm to women who
are raped and instead focus on the potential harm to accused men.92
Like the marital rape exemption, the denial of post-penetration rape
as a crime is "inherently sexist, in that [it] elevate[s] men's interests in
88. See, e.g., James R. Petersen, Rape or Regret?, PLAYBOY, May 2003, at 50, 51
(stating that the John Z. decision "calls for outrage" and that the "real violation" may
have been that John Z. was committed to a juvenile facility); Young, supra note 44 (noting
that In re John Z. has been characterized as an "anti-male witchhunt" that smacks of
"political correctness run amok"). Some men, apparently, feel personally victimized when
a woman withdraws consent for sex:
Over the years-and especially recently-I've had countless discussions with
men of various ages and backgrounds, who lamented finding themselves with a
woman who initially indicated by word, action, or both that she wanted to have
sex, but changed her mind for whatever reason after the deed was started. Some
of those men admitted to forcing the action, but the vast majority owned up to
being left worked up, baffled, and angry.... Almost without exception, each of
the men confiding in me believed that it was misleading, maddening, and perhaps
just plain wrong, among other arguments, for a woman to change her mind.
Derrick K. Baker, Men, Protect Yourselves: No Means No, N'DIGO, Aug. 7, 2003, at 10.
89. See Sitton, supra note 39, at 287 (quoting Joseph Neff, House Votes to Revoke Old
Law That Prevents Marital Rape Charges, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 7,
1993, at Al).
90. One men's rights attorney stated, "I hope to God that this case doesn't set a
precedent.... In California, all I can say is men are fair game if they pick the wrong sex
partners." The Tavis Smiley Show (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 24, 2003) [hereinafter
Leving Interview] (interviewing Jeffrey Leving, "men's rights attorney"), available at 2003
WL 7628543. Another commentator stated, "Once upon a time ... the deck was stacked
against women [in rape cases].... Now it's the accused whose rights are increasingly
abused." Mike Rosen, Victims Not Always Honest, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver,
Colo.), Aug. 15, 2003, at 39A.
91. See Petersen, supra note 88, at 51; Young, supra note 44. See generally Susan
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1132 (1986) (stating that "[tihe fear that women, acting
from shame or spite or vengeance, will abuse any power they are afforded in sexual
relations at the expense of 'innocent' men is the most pervasive theme in the legal
commentary on rape"); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the
Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1025-31 (1991)
(discussing false accusations as a prevailing rape myth). Statistics on the number of false
rape reports vary. The FBI has stated that the false report rate is eight percent, while
other studies have put the report rate at approximately forty percent. See Dick Haws, The
Elusive Numbers on False Rape, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov/Dec. 1997), available at
http://archives.cjr.org/year/97/6/rape.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
92. See Sitton, supra note 39, at 288.
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their reputations over the right of women to be free" from rape. 93
Although men's interests in their reputations should not
outweigh women's rights to be free from rape, sufficiency of proof
issues in post-penetration rape cases remain a significant point of
concern. 94  Where a woman withdraws consent during sexual
intercourse, the case is likely to come down to a "credibility contest"
between the victim and the defendant.95 Because the woman initially
consented to intercourse, evidence of physical resistance is unlikely,
which-though not required in North Carolina-serves an important
evidentiary function in many rape cases.96 In determining whether a
defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, this
lack of evidence is an important factor and provides a possible
rationale, at least in hindsight, for the North Carolina court's holding
in State v. Way.
The increased likelihood of a good faith mistake regarding
consent in post-penetration rape is another reason to scrutinize these
cases carefully. In most states, a rape defendant may argue
reasonable mistake-of-fact in his defense.97 Indeed, the defendant in
In re John Z. made such an argument. He argued that it was unclear
that Laura effectively communicated her withdrawal of consent to
John by replying "No, I need to go home" when John said, "Give me
a minute."98 Commentators have cited In re John Z. to suggest that
the Supreme Court of California has eradicated the defense of good
faith mistake regarding consent.99 A more accurate summary of the
93. See id.; see also State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1071 (Me. 1985) (finding "no
reason to strain to limit the ordinary meaning of the language of [the Maine] rape statute
[to allow post-penetration rape] for fear of a flood of possibly trumped up charges").
94. In her dissent in In re John Z., Justice Brown agreed with the majority that a
woman has an "absolute right" to withdraw consent after the commencement of sexual
intercourse, but Justice Brown maintained that the majority ignored the "critical questions
about the nature and sufficiency of proof in a postpenetration rape case." In re John Z.,
60 P.3d 183, 188 (Cal. 2003) (Brown, J., dissenting); see also McLellan, supra note 20, at
796 (noting the decreased likelihood of physical evidence in rapes that begin as consensual
intercourse).
95. See id. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 61, at 818 (noting that when
consent is raised as a defense to rape, a woman's credibility is a pivotal issue).
96. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 31.
97. See Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III, Date Rape, Social Convention,
and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 LAW & PHIL. 95, 97-98 (1992).
98. See In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 190 (Brown, J., dissenting) (questioning whether a
reasonable person in the defendant's position would understand "I need to go home" as a
demand to desist). The court found, however, that Laura's actions and words clearly
communicated her withdrawal of consent and that "no reasonable person in the
defendant's position" could have interpreted them otherwise. Id. at 187.
99. See Leving Interview, supra note 90 (arguing that Laura did not communicate her
withdrawal of consent and that the defendant in the case made a good faith mistake);
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case, however, is that the California court missed an opportunity to
state that a clear, unequivocal withdrawal of consent is required for
the State to meet its burden of proof in post-penetration rape cases.
While valid, these concerns regarding sufficiency of proof in
post-penetration rape cases should be weighed against the benefits of
defining post-penetration rape as a crime. As victims' advocates have
suggested, recognizing post-penetration rape as a crime reflects a
view of women as "responsible, autonomous beings who possess the
right to personal, sexual, and bodily self-determination."'10°  All
persons deserve the right to choose or decline sexual intimacy.1 1
Legal preservation of this right to choose or decline intimacy protects
individuals from the emotional vulnerability and physical dangers
accompanying unwanted sexual interaction.0 2 Additionally, requiring
men to stop intercourse when women withdraw consent or face rape
charges requires men to listen to women in sexual relationships.1°3
Moreover, recognizing post-penetration rape as a crime is likely to
protect young women and teenagers, who are perhaps the most likely
to be ambivalent about sex or feel pressured to have sex."
Petersen, supra, note 88, at 51 ("It was a he-said, she-said case, with murky accounts of
what had transpired and serious questions about what John should or should not have
surmised.").
100. See In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 188 (Brown, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger et al., The
Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 329, 330 (1988)).
101. "Few of our other freedoms, if any, are as essential to emotional well-being and
our capacity to lead a flourishing life.... It is time to recognize sexual autonomy as an
essential component of the freedoms that society properly guarantees and supports for
every human being." SCHULHOFER, supra note 21, at 282.
102. Id. at 100-01.
103. Fox News: The O'Reilly Factor (Fox television broadcast, Jan. 16, 2003)
[hereinafter Wolf Interview] (interview with Christopher Wolf, Victim's Rights
Advocate), available at 2003 WL 6663734 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
see also Mike McKee, Rape Can Occur After Consent, RECORDER (San Francisco, C.A.),
Jan. 7, 2003, at 1 (stating "when a woman says no to sex, even after intercourse has begun,
a man had better pay attention") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
104. The victims in several of these cases were teenagers. See, e.g., In re John Z., 60
P.3d at 184 (noting that Laura was seventeen years old); People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr.
161, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that the victim was fourteen years old); State v.
Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 665 (S.D. 1994) (noting that the victim was between twelve and
sixteen years of age). Some studies indicate that younger girls are more likely to be
coerced or forced into sexual intercourse. See KRISTIN A. MOORE ET AL., BEGINNING
Too SOON? ADOLESCENT SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, PREGNANCY AND PARENTHOOD: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND INTERVENTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/hsp/cyp/xsteesex.htm (last visited Jan. 25,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Research indicates that more than
half of all female rape victims in the United States are teenagers. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN iii-iv, at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/183781.pdf (Nov.
2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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Most importantly, recognizing post-penetration rape as a crime
debunks the "myth of the unstoppable male."1 5 In his defense, John
Z. argued that men need a "reasonable amount of time" in which to
end sexual intercourse after a woman withdraws her consent.0 6 The
defendant stated:
By essence of the act of sexual intercourse, a male's primal urge
to reproduce is aroused. It is therefore unreasonable for a
female and the law to expect a male to cease having sexual
intercourse immediately upon withdrawal of consent. It is only
natural, fair and just that a male be given a reasonable amount
of time to quell his primal urge .... 10
Citing the "primal urge" of the "male," the defendant disclaimed
both control over and responsibility for his actions, and denied legal
culpability for imposing sex on an unwilling partner.08 According to
his argument, it was only "natural" that he should be given time to
"quell his primal urge.""1 9 In effect, the defendant claimed that men,
by their very natures, would be biologically incapable of abiding by a
law that required them to listen and respond when their partners
withdrew consent for sex.10 This claim is insulting to men and
frightening for women who expect personal sexual autonomy and the
right to bodily integrity. Fortunately, the court rejected this "male
105. See Wolf Interview, supra note 103 (employing the phrase "myth of the
unstoppable male").
106. In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 187.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. As noted by Lois Pineau, the "primal urge" argument was once made by
those who would offer excuses for date rapists:
[People] tend to suppose that women must not behave sexually unless they are
prepared to carry through some fuller course of sexual interaction.... [The
rationale for this supposition] comes in the form of a belief in the especially
insistent nature of male sexuality, an insistence which lies at the root of natural
male aggression, and which is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to contain.
At a certain point in the arousal process, it is thought, a man's rational will gives
way to the prerogatives of nature. His sexual need can and does reach a point
where it is uncontrollable, and his natural masculine aggression kicks in to assure
that this need is met. Women, however, are naturally more contained and so it is
their responsibility not to provoke the irrational in the male. If they do go as far
as that, they have both failed in their responsibilities, and subjected themselves to
the inevitable. One does not go into the lion's cage and expect not to be eaten.
Pineau, supra note 45, at 434-35. For a discussion of the ways in which the myth of the
"male irresistible impulse" has been used to excuse criminal behavior by men and to
perpetuate societal sex discrimination, see generally Jane H. Aiken, Differentiating Sex
from Sex: The Male Irresistible Impulse, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (1984).
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primal urge" theory, finding a lack of supporting authority for it."'
Nonetheless, the court left the myth of the unstoppable male at least
partially intact.1 12 By failing to address the issue directly, and instead
stating merely that the defendant in this case was given "ample" time
to desist, the court offered no guidance as to what constitutes a
"reasonable time" and left open the possibility that a reasonable time
might not be immediately." 3 Thus, it is possible that the court
expected men to control their sexual urges eventually, although not
immediately upon a withdrawal of consent. This is a disturbing result.
In this and other ways, the California decision in In re John Z.
and the legal trend in other states on this issue1 4 should serve as a
lesson to North Carolina, and North Carolina should define post-
penetration rape as a criminal offense." 5 North Carolina is in need of
a statutory solution to the case law problem created by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina in State v. Way. As a solution to this
problem, this Recent Development recommends an amendment to
the North Carolina rape statutes. As a model for such a statute,
North Carolina legislators should look to Illinois, which on July 25,
2003, became the first state to enact a statute expressly making post-
penetration rape a crime.116 The Illinois statute provides: "A person
who initially consents to sexual penetration or sexual conduct is not
deemed to have consented to any sexual penetration or sexual
conduct that occurs after he or she withdraws consent during the
course of that sexual penetration or conduct.""' 7 A similarly-worded
provision appended to section 27 of Chapter 14 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina would invalidate the outdated holding of
111. In reJohn Z.,60 P.3d at 187.
112. See id.
113. In her dissent, Justice Brown mused, "[H]ow soon would have been soon enough?
Ten seconds? Thirty? A minute?" Id. at 190 (Brown, J., dissenting); see also State v.
Bunyard, 75 P.3d 750, 756 (2003) (rejecting the defendant's contention that he should have
been allowed a "reasonable time" to cease intercourse and stating that "continuing
intercourse for 5 to 10 minutes is not reasonable and constitutes rape").
114. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
115. See McLellan, supra note 20, at 804-08 (advocating a revised statute for
California).
116. See Wills, supra note 19.
117. Illinois legislators were criticized for enacting what some commentators believed
was an unnecessary law. See id. Unlike North Carolina, Illinois does not have binding
precedent excluding post-penetration rape from the statutory definition of rape. The
director of a victim's rights group, who said she could not imagine Illinois courts refusing
to uphold a woman's right to withdraw consent during intercourse, stated: "To me, it's
demeaning.... It's like the old saying: 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.' I don't think [the law
in Illinois] was broke." Id. Illinois lawmakers, however, wanted to avoid the type of
"legal battle" in Illinois that California endured in In re John Z. Id.
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State v. Way and would bring North Carolina in line with other states
on this issue. 8 In addition to the statutory language employed by
Illinois, a statutory amendment in North Carolina should state
explicitly that upon withdrawal of consent by one individual, the
other individual must cease sexual intercourse or contact
immediately.
An amendment to the rape statutes would be an important
advance for North Carolina. It would constitute recognition that men
are not driven by "primal urges" that make them incapable of
immediately acknowledging a woman's withdrawal of consent for
sexual intercourse. It would reflect a view of women as sexually
autonomous individuals with a right to bodily integrity, who have a
right to withdraw consent at any time-even after intercourse has
begun. It would acknowledge that women should not be valued
according to whether they have already been "penetrated." It would
reconcile conflicts between case law and statutory law,119 and it would
remove the physical resistance and strength requirements that the
rule of Way imposes upon women who withdraw consent during
intercourse.12 ° Women in North Carolina deserve the same rights
to-and legal protections of-sexual autonomy and bodily integrity
that are accorded women in other states. The North Carolina
General Assembly should take action to remedy the injustice of State
v. Way by enacting a statutory amendment to the rape statutes
making post-penetration rape a crime. In North Carolina, as
elsewhere, "no" should mean "no," whenever it is spoken.
ERIN G. PALMER
118. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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